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''Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki'', 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), is an important precedent in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for the litigation of aboriginal title in the United States. Applying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in ''City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York'' (2005), a divided panel held that the equitable doctrine of ''laches'' bars all tribal land claims sounding in ejectment or trespass, for both tribal plaintiffs and the federal government as plaintiff-intervenor. The ruling was the culmination of a two-decade-long litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York before Judge Neal Peters McCurn. Pursuant to a jury verdict, the Cayuga Nation of New York had been awarded $247.9 million, representing the current fair market value and 204 years of rental value damages for 64,015 acres conveyed by the tribe to the state in violation of the Nonintercourse Act (including pre-judgement interest). This precedent has effectively ended the viability of all aboriginal title litigation in the Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont), the site of nearly all of the unresolved Indian land claims in the United States.〔Fort (2011); Fort (2009); Wandres (2006).〕 Since the ruling, no tribal plaintiff has overcome the ''laches'' defense in a land claim in the Second Circuit.〔Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cnty. of Oneida, 617 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2010); Onondaga Nation v. New York, 2010 WL 3806492 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); Shinnecock Indian Nation v. New York, 2006 WL 3501099 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).〕 Four dissenting Supreme Court justices had previously adopted the view of the Second Circuit in ''County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State'' (1985); there, the majority did not reach the issue. ==Prior history== The Second Circuit ruling came twenty-five years after the Cayuga filed their complaint in the Northern District of New York in 1980 challenging two conveyances of land to the state in 1795 and 1807, totaling 64,015 acres. The following year, a class of defendant land owners was certified.〔Cayuga Indian Nation v. Carey, 89 F.R.D. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1981).〕 In 1983, the Cayuga survived the defendant's motion to dismiss. Judge McCurn held that the Nonintercourse Act applied to the conveyances in question, held that the Cayuga had a valid cause of action, and rejected the affirmative defenses of: sovereign immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution; statute of limitations, nonjusticiability, and abatement.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).〕 McCurn's ruling preceded the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in ''County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York State'' (1985), which rejected several of the same affirmative defenses, among others. In 1987, McCurn ruled on the motions for summary judgement. He held that: there was no evidence that the "treaties" through which New York State acquired the land had been ratified by the federal government; that the Indian Claims Commission did not have the authority to ratify the conveyances; and that his court had jurisdiction over the defendants.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 667 F. Supp. 938 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).〕 In 1990, he ruled that both the 1795 and 1807 conveyances violated the Nonintercourse Act, and were thus invalid.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 730 F. Supp. 485 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).〕 In 1991, interpreted the "reservation" terminology in the relevant treaty to also implicate that Act.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 758 F. Supp. 107 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).〕 McCurn also rejected the ''laches'' defense, on which the Second Circuit would eventually overturn his ruling.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 771 F. Supp. 19 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).〕 In response to the defendant's assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense, the federal government moved to intervene in the lawsuit, which was granted in November 1992. Having established liability, the litigation turned to the remedy. In 1999, McCurn ruled on the appropriate method to calculate damages. The court rejected the state's arguments that damages should be limited to the fair market value of the land at the time of the transaction, without pre-judgement interest (the approximate method used by the Indian Claims Commission for statutory claims against the federal government).〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 1999 WL 224615 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).〕 That same year, the court rejected ejectment as a remedy, thus ensuring that the Cayuga would be unable to recover possession of the lands; their remedy would be limited to monetary damages.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Cuomo, 1999 WL 509442 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).〕 The court also determined that joint and several liability would be inappropriate, and thus that the defendants would require separate trials.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 79 F. Supp. 2d 66 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).〕 Finally, the court determined that the state would be able to offset from the eventual damages any amount of consideration paid in the original conveyances as well as the value of infrastructure improvements; moreover, the plaintiff's anthropologist's testimony would not be admissible on the question of valuation, the jury would not be able to hear evidence on ''laches'' from either party, the Eleventh Amendment would not bar damages, and the plaintiffs would not be able to claim emotional, psychological, or cultural damages—only the economic value of the land.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 79 F. Supp. 2d 78 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).〕 Preparing for trial, the court threw out the plaintiff's real estate expert and approved the government's real estate expert, applying the Daubert standard.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 83 F. Supp. 2d 318 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).〕 He also clarified his prior ruling, to note that testimony on ''laches'' would be permitted inasmuch as it related to pre-judgement interest.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 2000 WL 654963 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), deadlines amended, 2000 WL 687901 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).〕 In 2001, the jury returned a verdict for the Cayuga, calculating damages the current fair market value of the land and the fair rental value of the land over 204 years in excess of $36 million; with the addition of pre-judgement interest, the damages reached $247,911,999.42.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 165 F. Supp. 2d 266 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).〕 The court also denied the defendant's post-trial motions, but stayed the collection of the judgement pending appeal.〔Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 188 F. Supp. 2d 223 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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